EDUCATION -HANDICAPPED

CHILDREN-STATE

REGULATION

PRO-

VIDING FOR PAYMENT OF EDUCATIONALLY JUSTIFIED RESIDENTIAL

Ultra Vires-D.S. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ.,
188 N.J. Super. 592, 458 A.2d 129 (App. Div. 1983).
COSTS NOT

D.S., a trainable mentally retarded child, was placed in a residential educational facility in January 1977 upon the recommendation of East Brunswick school officials. The local school district paid
his tuition, but refused to pay for the child's residential costs. The
parents of D.S. brought an action in chancery seeking reimbursement
of these expenses. 188 N.J. Super. at 596, 458 A.2d at 131. In February 1978, the judge ordered the case transferred to the State Board of
Education because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Id., 458 A.2d at 132.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 6:28-4.3(g) (1978), which requires
school districts to pay for the residential costs of children placed in
special facilities for educational purposes, became effective in August
1978. Id. at 595-96, 458 A.2d at 131-32. After a Fall 1978 hearing on
D.S.'s case, a classification officer in the State Department of Education ruled that the child's placement in the residential facility was
educationally justified, which made the East Brunswick Board of
Education responsible for residential costs. Id. at 596-97, 458 A.2d at
132. The local board appealed to the Commissioner of Education,
who ruled that East Brunswick was responsible for all residential costs
incurred by D.S. after August 1978. East Brunswick appealed to the
State Board of Education, alleging that the regulation was ultra vires
and unenforceable. The State Board upheld the validity of the regulation, which prompted the local Board to seek judicial review. Id. at
597, 458 A.2d at 132.
The appellate division rejected East Brunswick's contention that
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 6:28-4.3(g) (1978) was ultra vires and
affirmed the State Board's determination. Id. at 609, 458 A.2d at 140.
Writing for the court, Judge King noted that the New Jersey Constitution mandates a "thorough and efficient system of free public education" for all students, including the handicapped. Id. at 605, 458 A.2d
at 137. He observed that the New Jersey Legislature, in order to reach
this goal, had statutorily delegated broad authority to the State Board
of Education. Id. at 598-99, 608-09, 458 A.2d at 132-33, 139. Since
part of the State Board's responsibility included securing funds for
educational programs and N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 6:28-4.3(g)
(1978) was enacted to insure state qualification for federal money,
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Judge King decided that the regulation was a proper exercise of the
State Board's administrative power. Id. at 599, 458 A.2d at 133.
Judge King also rejected East Brunswick's argument that the
regulation conflicted with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-14 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984), which holds local boards responsible for the tuition
costs of children enrolled in special facilities. Id. at 602, 458 A.2d at
135. While he dismissed the State Board's argument that the term
"tuition" should be broadly construed to include residential costs, he
noted that the allegedly contradictory provision did not specifically
exclude reimbursement of residential costs. Id. at 608, 458 A.2d at
139. Judge King commented that the statute had been amended subsequent to the enactment of the questioned rule and that the amendment did not disavow the regulation's validity. Since the statute was
primarily concerned with allocating the cost to the school district
which was placing the child in a special institution, Judge King held
that the failure of the statute to assign residential costs did not prohibit
the State Board of Education from assigning these expenses to local
school districts. Id. at 608-09, 458 A.2d at 139-40.
The decision reached in this case seems fair in light of the clear
federal and state policies supporting the provision of educational services to the handicapped. Judge King correctly chose substance and
policy over form and technicality, and assured that minimum educational costs of handicapped children will be provided by local school
districts.
Susan Joseph
LANDLORD

AND TENANT-ABSENT

AGREEMENT

COURT MAY Fix REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE IN

By PARTIES

LEASE RENEWAL

OPTION CLAUSE-P.J. 'S Pantry v. Puschak, 188 N.J. Super. 580,

458 A.2d 123 (App. Div. 1983).
In 1975, Michael Puschak purchased a commercial building in
anticipation of converting it into a fast-food restaurant. Puschak sold
the business to Paul Ruth. The parties also executed a lease of the store
for a term of five years at a monthly rental of $350. 188 N.J. Super. at
580, 458 A.2d at 123. The lease contained provisions granting the
lessee a series of four options to renew for periods of five years at a
rental "reasonably to be agreed upon," inclusive of taxes. A second
provision stated that the contract for sale and the lease were a "combined package." Ruth assigned his interest in the premises to P.J.'s
Pantry, which in 1979 approached Puschak with the question of the
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renewal option and the rental price. The parties were unable to reach
an agreement. Id. at 582, 458 A.2d at 124.
P.J.'s Pantry filed suit demanding specific performance of the
renewal option agreement, and Puschak counterclaimed for possession
of the premises. Id. at 581, 458 A.2d at 123. The trial court refused to
enforce the option agreement, and accordingly entered judgment
granting possession to the defendant. Id. at 583, 458 A.2d at 124. The
judge reasoned that there was no readily objective way he could fix a
fair rent for the next five years, and that it would be a misuse of
judicial power if he were to do so. Id., 458 A.2d at 124-25. He
concluded that "it would be an imposition by the parties for them to
expect the court to make this arrangement for them."
The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court's analysis
unpersuasive. Id., 458 A.2d at 125. The court noted that the issue of
its authority to set the rental value of a leasehold was novel in New
Jersey, and acknowledged the conflicting case law on the subject in
other jurisdictions. Id. at 584-85, 458 A.2d at 125-26. Following,
however, what it perceived to be the current trend, the court held
that the option clause was enforceable, and stated that absent agreement by the parties a court is permitted to determine and impose a
"fair market rental" for an extended lease term following exercise of a
renewal option. Id. at 583, 458 A.2d at 125. The court observed that
since the plain purpose of the options was to assure the long-term
stability of the venture, their presence in the lease was an important
factor in the plaintiff's purchase of the business. Id. at 583-84, 458
A.2d at 125. Noting the difficulties in determining the rental value of
a long-term leasehold, the court reasoned that the parties clearly
intended the rent for each option term to be the fair market value and
concluded that refusing to enforce the option clause would deprive the
plaintiff of a significant part of the economic interest contemplated in
the original transaction. Id. at 584, 458 A.2d at 125. The matter was
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the
decision. Id. at 585, 458 A.2d at 126.
P.]. 's Pantry permits New Jersey courts to fix a reasonable rent in
a lease option renewal when the parties are unable to reach a meaningful agreement themselves. Because New Jersey courts have not
heretofore addressed this issue, the decision should provide a rule for
courts to rely upon when they wish to enforce a lease whose rate terms
are in dispute.
Carol Romano
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CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING--NEW JERSEY PAROLE ACT INTERPRETED AS PROVIDING DUE PROCESS FOR MULTIPLE OFFENDERS DE-

NIED PAROLE ELIGIBILITY REDUCTIONs-New Jersey State Parole

Board v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 460 A.2d 103 (1983).
James Byrne, a fourth offender, was serving a ten to twelve year
sentence for possession of drugs with intent to distribute. 93 N.J. at
198, 460 A.2d at 106. Tony Maples, a second offender, was serving a
ten to twelve year sentence for possession of drugs with intent to
distribute and a concurrent four to five year term for simple possession
of drugs. Under the parole law in effect at the time these sentences
were imposed, first, second, third, and fourth offenders became eligible for parole after serving one-third, one-half, two-thirds, or fourfifths of their maximum sentences, respectively. Id. at 196-97, 460
A.2d at 105. After passage of the Parole Act of 1979, however, the
parole eligibility dates for multiple offenders were to be computed as
if one fewer crime had been committed. Id. at 196, 460 A.2d at 105.
The Act further provided that this full-step reduction could be denied
to an inmate if the prosecutor or sentencing judge advised the Parole
Board, even without explanation, that the punitive aspects of the
sentence had not yet been fulfilled. Id. at 197, 460 A.2d at 105. The
inmate then would not be eligible for parole until serving an additional period equal to one-half the difference between the parole
eligibility under the old law and the eligibility under the 1979 Act.
For both Byrne and Maples, the prosecutors advised that the full-step
reductions be denied, and the Parole Board complied.
Byrne and Maples appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division. Id. at 198, 460 A.2d at 106. In Byrne's case, the
court held that neither the Parole Act nor the processes afforded
thereunder violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment since the Act created only a "possibility of parole" and not a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. at 198-99, 460 A.2d at
106. The court also found that the absence of a statement of reasons
from the prosecutor or judge who advised against a full-step reduction
was of no legal consequence. In Maples' case, the appellate division
affirmed the Board's action based upon the Byrne decision. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted petitions for certification filed by
both Byrne and Maples. Id. at 199, 460 A.2d at 106.
The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part the
judgment of the appellate division. Id. at 214, 460 A.2d at 115. The
court initially held that the interest in the full-step reduction claimed
by the defendants was a liberty interest protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 206-08, 460 A.2d at 110-
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11. Writing for the court, Justice O'Hern reasoned that while there is
no constitutional right to parole, the Parole Act, by defining eligibility
guidelines, created a constitutionally protected expectation of parole.
Id. at 208, 460 A.2d at 111. Justice O'Hern then considered what
minimum procedural guarantees would make the state's denial of the
full-step reduction valid. Id. at 208-09, 460 A.2d at 112.
In determining what process was due, the court balanced the
straightforward state interest in making sure the punitive aspects of a
prisoner's sentence is served against the prisoner's interest that simple
error or confusion of identity would negate a deserved parole reduction. Id. at 208-12, 460 A.2d at 112-13. Justice O'Hern concluded that
three basic procedures are required to protect against erroneous determinations: notice to the prisoner of the parole disposition, a report by
the objecting judge or prosecutor explaining why the punitive portion
of the sentence is not complete, and an opportunity for the inmate to
respond in writing to that report. Id. at 211, 460 A.2d at 113. Justice
O'Hern further resolved that although these requirements were not
explicitly mentioned in the Parole Act, the Legislature would choose
to include them rather than to have the challenged provision eliminated. Id. at 212-13, 460 A.2d at 114. He therefore construed the Act
to include these procedures, and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Id. at 214, 460 A.2d at 115.
The Parole Act of 1979 is a generally successful effort to eliminate
arbitrary sentencing. In attempting, however, to curtail parole eligibility for multiple offenders who had not served their punitive requirements, the Legislature inadvertently left in the hands of the
judge or prosecutor what was most antithetical to the Act: the strong
possibility of unfettered discretion. In requiring a statement of reasons
and an opportunity to respond, the court does not expressly limit the
power of the judge or prosecutor, but rather induces them to exercise
their authority in a reasonable manner. The unanimity of the court
reflects the consistency of the opinion not only in ensuring constitutional due process, but also in furthering the efforts of the Legislature
to eliminate the vagaries of sentencing.

Patrick Gleason
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TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DRUG MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY IN
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS ACTION MEASURED BY NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS

Lederle Laboratories, 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (App. Div.
1983).
AND STATE-OF-THE-ART

DEFENSE VALID-Feldman

v.

Whenever Carol Feldman developed an infection, her father, a
medical doctor, treated it with Declomycin, an antibiotic produced
by Lederle Laboratories (Lederle). 189 N.J. at 426, 460 A.2d at 20304. Harold Feldman estimated that he administered the drug to Carol
on as many as twenty occasions during the period between her birth in
February 1960 and the latter part of 1963. When Carol's first set of
teeth appeared, her mother observed that they were gray. It was
subsequently established that the discoloration resulted from the Declomycin treatments. Id. at 426, 460 A.2d at 204.
Harold Feldman brought an action as parent and guardian ad
litem of Carol against Lederle, basing the claim for relief upon the
theories of strict liability and negligence. At trial Lederle relied upon
a state-of-the-art defense and adduced proofs showing that during the
period of Carol's treatments neither it nor the scientific community
were aware that the use of Declomycin could bring about discoloration of teeth. The case was tried on that basis, and the jury returned
a verdict in Lederle's favor. The judgment was affirmed by the appellate division, and Feldman's petition for certification to the New
Jersey Supreme Court was granted. The supreme court, however,
remanded the case back to the appellate division for reconsideration in
light of Beshada v. Johns-ManvilleProd. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d
539 (1982), wherein the court held that in failure-to-warn strict liability cases, knowledge of the potential hazards of a product is imputed
to the producer and that a state-of-the-art defense is unavailable. 189
N.J. Super. at 426-27, 460 A.2d at 204.
On remand, the appellate division distinguished Beshada and
affirmed the trial court judgment in favor of Lederle. Id. at 432, 460
A.2d at 207. Judge McElroy, writing for the court, noted that New
Jersey courts have followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A,
comment k (1965), which explicitly recognizes that the manufacture
and use of certain inherently unsafe products, including drugs, -is
justified because of the benefits they provide. Id. at 427-28, 460 A.2d
at 204. Under comment k, liability of drug manufacturers for harms
proximately caused by their products is measured by negligence standards and therefore the state-of-the-art is a valid defense. Strict liability is limited to instances where drugs are improperly prepared or
where manufacturers fail to furnish adequate warnings of the dangers
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known to accompany the use of their drugs. Id. at 428, 460 A.2d at
205.
The appellate court observed that the reason for the comment k
exception was a concern that the specter of "almost absolute liability"
would substantially reduce the incentive of manufacturers to produce
and market indispensable drugs. Judge McElroy contrasted this concern against the Beshada court's view that a manufacturer is best
situated to distribute the costs of harm caused by defective products
by passing them on to the consumer. While Judge McElroy conceded
that Beshada's impact upon ordinary products liability cases was favorable, he was unwilling to extend the holding to actions against
drug manufacturers. He concluded that effecting such a change
would require a delicate balancing of competing public policy considerations and that the state legislature or supreme court were the more
proper authorities to consider the issue. Id. at 434, 460 A.2d at 209.
The decision of the appellate division does little to firmly settle
the question of whether drug manufacturers should be treated as an
exception to the Beshada rule and should be permitted to invoke the
state-of-the-art defense in products liability actions. Rather, the opinion merely served to sharpen the issue and present it to other authorities for resolution. The court correctly acknowledged that an issue
requiring an authoritative choice between competing policy concerns
of great magnitude should not be adjudged by an intermediate appellate court. Thus, the court squarely placed on others the onus of
delineating the scope of Beshada.

Robert S. Burney

CONVERSION-

WAREHOUSES-

BAILOR'S PRIMA FACIE CASE OF CON-

VERSION ESTABLISHED UPON PROOF OF DELIVERY,

REGOODS-Joseph

DEMAND FOR

DELIVERY AND BAILEE'S FAILURE TO RETURN BAILED

H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Griswold & Bateman Warehouse Co., 189
N.J. Super. 141, 458 A.2d 1341 (Law Div. 1983).
Griswold and Bateman Warehouse Co. (Griswold) stored 337
cases of Chivas Regal Scotch Whiskey for Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc.
(Reinfeld) in Griswold's bonded warehouse. When Reinfeld sent its
truck to reclaim the whiskey, forty cases were found to be missing.
Reinfeld brought suit in both conversion and negligence for the wholesale value of the missing goods, $6,417.60. Griswold admitted its

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:211

negligence but claimed that its liability was limited by contract to
$1,925.00.
At trial, after introducing evidence of its delivery, demand for
redelivery, and Griswold's failure to return the bailed goods, Reinfeld
argued that the burden of production shifted to the defendant to
explain the disappearance. The plaintiff argued that absent such an
explanation, its proofs established a prima facie case raising a presumption of both conversion and negligence. The plaintiff further
asserted that because N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:7-204(2) (West 1962)
prohibits a warehouseman from limiting his liability for conversion,
the contractual limitation was ineffective. Griswold argued that Reinfeld's proofs raised only a presumption of negligence and that, consequently, the contract's limitation of damages was controlling. 189
N.J. Super. at 143, 458 A.2d at 1342.
The trial court adopted the rule from I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v.
Municipal Warehouse Co., 50 N.Y.2d 657, 409 N.E.2d 849, 431
N.Y.S.2d 372 (1980), and held that Reinfeld had established a prima
facie case of conversion and that the burden of producing evidence to
explain the whiskey's disappearance shifted to Griswold. 189 N.J.
Super. at 144, 458 A.2d at 1343. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would permit unscrupulous warehousemen to profit by stealing
goods entrusted to their care. Id. at 143, 458 A.2d at 1342-43. The
court observed that knowledge concerning the fate of the goods was
available only to Griswold and that he therefore was in the best
position to explain their disappearance. Id. at 144, 458 A.2d at 1343.
The court further held that not only had defendant failed to meet
plaintiff's prima facie case, but also that evidence introduced by
defendant established misdelivery as the cause of the loss. Misdelivery
by a bailee, the court noted, was the legal equivalent of conversion.
The court accordingly determined that the goods had been converted
and that Griswold was liable for their full market value. Id. at 147,
458 A.2d at 1344-45.
The court's decision upholds the statutory policy embodied in
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:7-204(2) (West 1962). By shifting the burden
of production to the bailee subsequent to the bailor's introduction of
proof of delivery, demand, and the bailee's failure to return the goods,
the court prevents the warehouseman from manipulating the rules of
evidence to achieve a statutorily impermissible end. Thus, the consequences of silence are made to fall upon their authors, and those
seeking the benefits of limited liability are required to establish their
entitlement to such protections.
Stephen J. Foley, Jr.
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DOMESTIC

RELATIONS-DIVORCE-TERMINAL DATE OF MARRIAGE
FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION PURPOSES IS DATE OF FILING OF COMPLAINT WHICH CULMINATES

IN FINAL JUDGMENT OF

DIVORCE-

Portner v. Portner, 93 N.J. 215, 460 A.2d 115 (1983).
In August 1974, Morton Portner separated from his wife, Barbara, and moved from their New Jersey marital home to Philadelphia.
93 N.J. at 216, 460 A.2d at 116. On November 6, 1974 Barbara filed a
complaint for separate maintenance in the Superior Court of New
Jersey, and an order for support pendente lite was entered in February
1975. Morton filed for divorce in Pennsylvania in August 1975, but
the complaint was dismissed. Morton moved to Delaware where he
again filed an action for divorce. This complaint also was dismissed.
Id. at 217, 460 A.2d at 116. In December 1979 Barbara amended her
complaint to demand a judgment of divorce. Morton filed a counterclaim for divorce, and in September 1980 a divorce judgment was
entered.
Between the time of his initial separation from his wife and the
judgment for divorce, Morton allegedly acquired property. New Jersey's Divorce Reform Act of 1971 provides for the equitable distribution of assets acquired during a marriage. Id. at 218, 460 A.2d at 116.
The trial court determined that for the purpose of equitable distribution, the terminal date of the marriage was the date the Portners
separated in 1974, and that therefore the acquired property was not
subject to equitable distribution. The appellate division reversed,
holding that the marriage ended on the date Morton filed an action
for divorce in Pennsylvania. Barbara appealed to the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Id. at 217, 460 A.2d at 116.
Writing for the court, Justice Garibaldi noted that the watershed
case of Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974), established that for the purpose of determining the equitable distribution of
assets, a marriage ends when a divorce complaint is filed. 93 N.J. at
219, 460 A.2d at 117. Justice Garibaldi observed that subsequent cases
which varied from this rule involved situations where the intent of
both parties to unconditionally terminate the marriage was clearly
indicated, a circumstance not present in the current case. Id. at 220,
460 A.2d at 118. The court found that the Painter rule was still the
most practical formulation to determine the terminal date of a marriage. Id. at 219, 460 A.2d at 117. Justice Garibaldi concluded,
however, that in order for a divorce complaint to signify the termination of a marriage, the complaint must culminate in a final judgment
for divorce. Id. at 225, 460 A.2d at 120.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:211

Justice Garibaldi noted that since Morton did not seek a divorce
in New Jersey until four years after his groundless out-of-state complaints were dismissed, it was reasonable to assume that Morton filed
the foreign complaints not to end the marriage, but to prevent Barbara from sharing the assets he acquired after his desertion. Id. at 222,
460 A.2d at 118. She therefore reversed the appellate division ruling,
and held that for equitable distribution purposes, the marriage ended
on the date that Barbara amended her complaint to demand a judgment for divorce. Id. at 225, 460 A.2d at 120. Justice Garibaldi
remanded the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with
the holding. Id. at 225, 460 A.2d at 120.
In Portner,the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed the Painter
rule as the standard to be applied in ascertaining the terminal date of
a marriage. The decision restricts exceptions to the rule to situations in
which an absolute breakdown of the marital relationship is clearly
established. Portneralso prevents a spouse from attempting to circumvent the Divorce Act by filing an unmeritorious divorce complaint
solely for the purpose of depriving the other spouse of assets acquired
during the marriage.
Shirley L. Berger

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PAROLE-JUDICIALLY IMPOSED MINIMUM
PAROLE INELIGIBILITY TERMS INAPPLICABLE TO SEX OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO AVENEL TREATMENT-State

v. Chapman, 189 N.J.

Super. 379, 460 A.2d 177 (App. Div. 1983).
Donald Chapman abducted and sexually assaulted a young
woman. After pleading guilty to charges of kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault, Chapman underwent evaluation at the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center (Avenel). His behavior was determined to be repetitive and compulsive, and it was recommended that
Chapman be sentenced to the Center's treatment program. 189 N.J.
Super. at 382, 460 A.2d at 179.
At the sentencing proceeding, Chapman was sentenced to Avenel
for a term of twenty years for kidnapping and for a concurrent term of
twenty years for aggravated sexual assault. Sentence was served pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:47-3 (West 1982), which affords the
sentencing judge the option of imposing upon an eligible sex offender
either a treatment disposition or a prison term. Each term was made
subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum parole ineligibility period.
In so burdening Chapman's sentence, the trial judge concluded that
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6b (West 1982), which allows the sentencing
judge to fix a minimum parole ineligibility term of up to one-half the
set term of imprisonment, was applicable to Avenel sentences. At a
second sentencing proceeding, the judge concluded that Chapman's
previous offense of abduction with intent to rape warranted the application of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-6 (West 1982), which provides that
a repeated sex offender's sentence must include a fixed minimum
parole ineligibility period of five years. Id. at 383, 460 A.2d at 180.
The effect of this judgment on Chapman's earlier sentence was left
unclear.
The appellate court agreed that the multiple offender provision
of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-6 (West 1982) was properly invoked in
light of Chapman's previous offense. Id. at 384, 460 A.2d at 180. The
court, however, rejected the trial judge's interpretation of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:43-6b (West 1982) and held that the statute was not
applicable to either a first or second offender's Avenel sentence. Id. at
389, 460 A.2d at 183. In reaching this determination, the appellate
court noted that the legislative intent of the New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice (Code) was to follow the "release on cure" principle.
Id. at 390, 460 A.2d at 183-84. Judge Pressler, writing for the court,
acknowledged that applying N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-6 (West 1982),
a Code provision, to persons undergoing Avenel treatment deviated
from "release on cure," but she observed that the 1979 Parole Act,
which supersedes the Code, explicitly recognized N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-6 (West 1982) as applicable to repeat offenders sentenced to
Avenel. Id. at 392, 460 A.2d at 184-85. She reasoned that since N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6b (West 1982), also a Code provision, was not
recognized in the Parole Act as a condition of an Avenel sentence, the
Legislature did not intend the provision to be a further exception to
"release on cure." Id., 460 A.2d at 185. Judge Pressler determined
that the sentences imposed on Chapman were improper because
Avenel treatment was not an appropriate sentence for kidnapping,
and because an Avenel sentence for sexual assault was not subject to
the minimum parole ineligibility term of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6b
(West 1982). The sentences were vacated and the case was remanded
to the trial court. Id. at 399, 460 A.2d at 188.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Michels contended that N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:43-6b (West 1982) should apply to offenders given an
Avenel sentence. Id. at 401, 460 A.2d at 190 (Michels, J., dissenting).
He argued that the majority had effected an implied repealer of part
of the general sentencing provisions of the Code. Id. at 402, 460 A.2d
at 190 (Michels, J., dissenting).
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In Chapman, the appellate division set guidelines relating to the
sentencing of sex offenders in an attempt to both clarify provisions of
the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice and to ensure the Code's
intent to "release on cure." By eliminating, however, the fixed parole
ineligibility term for first offense Avenel dispositions and by limiting it
to five years for second offense Avenel sentences, judges who might
have otherwise been inclined to favor rehabilitation might now find a
fixed parole ineligibility term in prison more in keeping with public
safety interests.

Darlene Pereksta

